'[L]aw is seen as a dynamic process, rather than a static template through which to view politics'Miéville here is talking about international law, yet I think this quote has much relevance for any general theory of law. Pashukanis has already shown us that law is not a 'thing', it is rather a social relation, taking on specific characteristics. Therefore it follows that since law is about the abstract subject enforcing his or her right against the other subject, law is not a thing but a process of social regulation. Therefore, my description of 'levels' must be seen as different stages of the process of legal regulation. This means they exist in an organic unity, and will 'bleed' into eachother. This position allows us to conceptualise law as it is, but without making a rigid distinction between the creation and enforcement of laws. It also gives importance to the process of enforcing the norm (and therefore to the role of the judicary), such a position is far superior to other Marxist accounts, and accords much more with reality.
China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law, p. 38